Willkommen zum Fukushima-Info- und -Diskussions-Forum des physikBlogs.

Die Zahl der Kommentare auf unsere Fukushima-Beiträge ist jenseits der 1000er Marke. Es wird zu unübersichtlich!
Daher gibt's dieses Forum, bei dem ihr über den Unfall von Fukushima kommentieren könnt, was das Zeug hält!

Zu einer kleinen Einführung, hier entlang.

Ihr seid neu hier? Das physikBlog hat in vier Artikeln den Unfall von Fukushima begleitet. Eine Lektüre, zumindest des Aktuellsten, empfiehlt sich vor dem Mitdiskutieren!

Es sei erwähnt, dass wir bei der Moderation der Kommentare hier weniger streng sind, als im Blog. Ihr seid freier in eurer Themenwahl.

Viel Spaß, André & Andi vom physikBlog.

[Blog] Mögliche Fehler und Versäumnisse
  • TimTim Januar 2012
    > TEPCO left backup power for nuclear data equipment detached for 4 months - The Mainichi Daily News
    http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/news/20120120p2a00m0na008000c.html

    Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) left the backup power source of a reactor-monitoring device at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant disconnected for four months until the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami triggered a disaster at the plant, the company has admitted.

    Failure to connect the backup source is said to have prevented data on the status of the plant being sent to the government for about two hours after the outbreak of the crisis. It is believed this may have affected the initial response to the disaster and the predictions on the spread of radioactive materials.

    The device left without backup power was a media converter, which monitors the state of the plant and sends data to the government's Emergency Response Support System (ERSS). The data is also sent to the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), which provides quick estimates on the effects of radiation in an emergency and is used in predicting the spread of radioactive materials.

    TEPCO officials said that workers tried to connect the backup power supply to the media converter during renewal work in November 2010, but the cable was too short so it was left disconnected.

    As a result, when the Great East Japan Earthquake struck and the nuclear power plant lost its external power supply at about 2:47 p.m. on March 11, 2011, data transmissions stopped. Due to aftershocks from the quake, the communications network was not restored until 4:43 p.m. It is believed that early data could have been sent had the backup power source been connected.

    TEPCO official Junichi Matsumoto, however, said the company believed the temporary loss of data did not greatly affect SPEEDI.

    "What was unable to be transmitted was data from the early stages, and it is assumed that this had little effect on SPEEDI. We don't believe there was great urgency," he said.

    ERSS devices monitor the reactor containment vessels at nuclear power plants across Japan, and predict how nuclear accidents will unfold. The government has spent 15.5 billion yen developing the system.


  • TimTim Januar 2012
    Keine Aufzeichnungen von Treffen des Fukushima-Krisenstabs:

    Wie durch eine Anfrage der NHK im November nun bekannt wurde, hat der Krisenstab in der heißen Phase der Krise am Atomkraftwerk Fukushim Daiichi offenbar keinerlei Aufzeichnungen von ihren Treffen anlegen lassen.

    Per Gesetz ist die Regierung dazu verpflichtet, Aufzeichnungen über wichtige Entscheidungen anzufertigen, um nachträglich Verantwortungen der Regierung klären und die Bürger den Entscheidungsfindungsprozess nachvollziehen können. Experten sind der Ansicht, dies sei eine schwere Nachlässigkeit, da diese Protokolle möglicherweise die Wiederholung von Fehlern hätten verhindern können.

    Als Grund für das Fehlen der Prokolle über das Vorgehenn des Krisenstabs, der vom damaligen Premierminister geleitet und alle Kabinettsmitglieder umfasst hatte, gab die verantwortliche Person bei der japanischen Atomsicherheitsbehörde NISA, die als Sekretariat des Krisenstabs diente gegenüber der NHK an, er sei zu beschäftigt gewesen um Protokolle anzulegen.

    Die Mitschriften hätten wichtige Entscheidungen des Krisenstabs, wie die Festlegung der Evakuierungsgebiete, grundlegende Regeln für Dekontamination und Bestimmungen zur Einschränkung der Ausfuhrt landwirtschaftlicher Produkte und Informationen über die für die Maßnahmen verantwortlichen Personen enthalten.

    Das Kabinettsbüro befragt jetzt den Verantwortlichen bei der NISA – und untersucht das Fehlen von Protokollen beim gemeinsamen Krisenstabs von Tokyo Electric Power (TEPCO) und der Regierung, die darüber diskutierten, wie mit dem Störfall umzugehen sei. Das berichtet die NHK.


    Source: http://www.spreadnews.de/japan-aktuell-gesundheitsversorgung-fur-kinder-aus-fukushima-fraglich/1119918/
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > Piping at Fukushima reactor found insufficient to withstand quake - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun
    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201201310043
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > Haruki Madarame: "No Memory of First Week of the Accident Because I Couldn't Sleep" | EX-SKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/02/haruki-madarame-no-memory-of-first-week.html

    "Unterhaltsam" .. es stellt sich wohl eher die Frage, ob dies so zutrifft und wenn ja, wieso sie jetzt so offen sind.
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > Power Transmission Tower for Fukushima I Nuke Plant Fell Because Drain Pipe Wasn't Installed When the Site Was Prepared in 1960s | EX-SKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/02/power-transmission-tower-for-fukushima.html

    Kann vorkommen schätze ich - mehr Datenpunkt zur Ursache für den Verlust der "off-site power".
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    Habt ihr das mitbekommen?

    > Other Reactors In Japan Barely Survived Tsunami, Risked Meltdowns | SimplyInfo
    http://www.simplyinfo.org/?p=4935

    Fukushima Daiichi wasn’t the only nuclear power plant in Japan to struggle during the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami.

    Fukushima Daini now says that they barely averted a meltdown there. The seawater pumps that create the cooling loop for the plant were damaged in the tsunami. Daini manged to keep one power line operating, this allowed staff to monitor the reactors. Units at Daini still went high in pressure causing at least one unit to crack the containment vessel. Had it not been for the massive accident at Daiichi people would likely be still talking about the critical near miss at Daini.

    The tsunami also caused problems at the Tokai nuclear power plant and their number 2 reactor. An emergency diesel generator cooling pump was submerged by the tsunami. Experts now think that had the tsunami been higher at Tokai it would have caused a major accident at that reactor also.


    image

    > Fukushima No. 2 plant was 'near meltdown' : National : DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE (The Daily Yomiuri)
    http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120209007089.htm

    FUKUSHIMA--The Fukushima No. 2 nuclear power plant was "near meltdown" after being hit by tsunami following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, according to the head of the plant.

    The No. 2 plant, on the border of Naraha and Tomioka towns in Fukushima Prefecture, was opened to the media Wednesday for the first time since the disaster. It is 12 kilometers from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, which suffered a meltdown. Both facilities are operated by Tokyo Electric Power Co.

    Plant chief Naohiro Masuda, in charge of plant operations since the crisis, told reporters Wednesday, "The No. 2 plant almost suffered the same fate as No. 1 [which led to a severe crisis]."

    On March 11, a 9-meter-high tsunami struck the No. 2 plant, while the No. 1 plant was hit by a 13-meter-high tsunami. The tsunami caused the No. 2 plant's seawater pumps, used to cool reactors, to fail. Of the plant's four reactors, three were in danger of meltdown.

    Luckily, one external high-voltage power line still functioned, allowing plant staff in the central control room to monitor data on internal reactor temperatures and water levels.

    By March 15, the No. 2 plant's four reactors reached a state of cold shutdown without any leakage of radioactive materials.

    "[At that point, the situation at the No. 2 plant] was considerably different from the No. 1 plant where it was difficult to know what was going on," Masuda, 53, said.

    However, despite intense efforts by all employees, it took a long time to stabilize the reactors.

    On March 11, about 2,000 employees of the No. 2 plant worked to stabilize the reactors. Some employees connected 200-meter sections of cable, each weighing more than a ton, over a distance of nine kilometers.

    Masuda noted the timing of the disaster was critical in saving the plant.

    "We were lucky it happened on a Friday afternoon [and not on a weekend]," he said.

    Masuda pointed out only 40 employees would have been at the plant if the earthquake had occurred in the evening or on a weekend.

    "[In that case] it would be have been difficult for us to deal with the disaster," he said.

    The Fukushima prefectural government conducted an on-site inspection at the No. 2 plant on Wednesday and repeated a request to TEPCO to decommission the facility.

    Masuda did not elaborate and said, "At the moment, I can only say we'll maintain a state of cold shutdown."

    The No. 2 plant's No. 1 reactor began operating in 1982. Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, a Nuclear Emergency Situation Declaration was issued for both the No. 1 and No. 2 plants. The declaration was lifted for the No. 2 plant in December.


    > Radiation In Urine Of Children In Tokyo, Daini Has Cracked Containment | SimplyInfo
    http://www.simplyinfo.org/?p=4496

    UPDATE: A look back at old TEPCO documents shows unit 1 at Fukushima Daini (Fukushima II), had an increase in reactor containment pressure at 6:08pm March 11. All four units at Daini appear to have been subsequently vented as their suppression chambers were over 100 degrees Celsius and ceased working.

    The other bit of bad news this morning. The containment of one of the reactors at Fukushima Daini (Fukushima II) has been found to be broken. An expert in metallic materials made the statement and went on to state that the earthquake caused the containment damage and TEPCO is currently trying to repair it. What is not 100% clear right now, if they are referring to the concrete and steel containment bulb or the steel reactor pressure vessel. We are currently going with the assumption they meant literally the containment vessel (PCV) not the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Sometimes between casual phrasing and translations “containment” is used interchangeably. Damaged containment (PCV) on a much newer reactor design is a very bad sign for reactor reliability in general. This calls into question why the public is just finding this out now and why they are finding it out through an academic experts and not through TEPCO and the government. There were worker reports of smoke coming from the reactor buildings at Daini after the initial quake.

    On March 14 radiation rose at Daini, TEPCO claimed it was due to radiation from Daiichi.
    Smoke was also seen coming from a turbine building at Daini on March 30th.


    > Smoke Rises at 2nd Nuke Plant



    > Just In: Japanese Expert Says Fukushima II (not I) Nuke Plant's Containment Vessel Has Been Damaged by the Quake | EX-SKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/01/japanese-expert-says-fukushima-ii-not-i.html

    > Japan Atomic Power Plant Barely Withstood Tsunami - JIJI PRESS
    http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2012021300836

    Tokai, Ibaraki Pref., Feb. 13 (Jiji Press)--Japan Atomic Power Co.'s Tokai No. 2 nuclear power plant in eastern Japan barely withstood the tsunami that followed the March 11 earthquake, experts said Monday.
    A group of experts inspected a pump for cooling an emergency power generator that was submerged by the tsunami and a power generation turbine partly damaged by the 9.0-magnitude quake.
    The group visited the plant as part of a program of the industry ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency to check the effects of the earthquake and tsunami on nuclear power plants across the country.
    After the inspection, Takao Nishikawa, professor emeritus at Tokyo Metropolitan University and a member of the group, said that the plant had barely withstood the tsunami and that it would not have survived the impact of a tsunami a little larger.
    It was good that Japan Atomic Power responded immediately after it recognized problems at the plant, he said.
  • HephaistosHephaistos Februar 2012
    @Tim handelt es sich bei der "Fast-Kernschmelze" in Fukushima Daini um dieselbe Meldung?

    http://www.spreadnews.de/japan-aktuell-zweites-fukushima-kraftwerk-entging-nur-knapp-der-kernschmelze/1120266/
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    Yep
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > U.S. worried about Fukushima meltdown early on: commission transcript - The Mainichi Daily News
    http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120222p2g00m0dm025000c.html

    Wenn jemand den Link zu den Dokumenten findet, bitte posten.
  • HephaistosHephaistos Februar 2012
    Der sollte hier "irgendwo zu finden" sein glaube ich?

    http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/
  • clancy688clancy688 Februar 2012
    Die Dinger wurden gerade im physicsforums gepostet, als PDF (paar tausend Seiten) und als Audio:

    http://physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3778943&postcount=12405
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    Danke clancy!

    Den YT der NRC kann man vergessen.. n paar Filter um das Rauschen und andere Geräusche zu entfernen sollte schon drin sein..

    Der kurze Podcast hier ist sinnvoller:
    http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/japans-quake/nuclear-regulatory-commission-releases-audio-fukushima-disaster
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    The "independent fukushima accident investigation committee" has released its report after hearing 300 people such as former prime minister Kan and US high officials. The simultaneous occurrence of earthquake/tsunami with nuclear accident had not been foreseen so that the emergency manual was unusable. Politicians lacked basic knowledge of the legal framework. The response was haphazard and taken in haste at the last minute. Accurate information did not reach the prime minister office. The scientific support framework to advise politicians was too weak. The NISA is not educating safety professionals so that its human resources and ideas are poor. The NISA did not build plans and proposals. Tepco's responses (not being aware that IC is turned off, not starting alternative injection immediately, having troubles with venting) are causal factors of the widening of the accident.


    According to the "independent fukushima accident investigation committee", prime minister Kan had some merits such as going to Tepco's main office to encourage Tepco not to evacuate (leaving 50 people on the site), but he interfered too much with the site when he managed such things as the size of batteries. His way of releasing information failed, causing distrust among citizens. Japan ignored suggestions that came from abroad after the September 11 attacks. The way of thinking was "as it is 100% safe, why bother to take countermeasures". The safety myth was designed as a tool against antinuclear activists, but it became an obstacle for the government itself, who failed from taking the latest safety knowledge and technology into account.


    According to the "independent fukushima accident investigation committee", prime minister Kan and 4 politicians said "we did not receive information from the ministry of education and science about SPEEDI (the radiation spreading analysis system) until many days after the accident and ignored its existence until then". Yukio Edano said he heard about it for the first time in the news around 15 March. According to Edano, the reason why there was no information is because the SPEEDI results were thought to be too imprecise, as the radiation figures could not be obtained. According to the committee, SPEEDI was developed and installed as nothing but a trick to buy citizen's confidence.


    Source: http://physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3789025&postcount=12420
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    Hab bis heute fast die ersten 600 Seiten der NRC Protokolle gelesen. :O

    N netter Thriller :-) Ist zwar auch viele "noise" mit dabei, jedoch spannende Einblicke über die Sicht und Erkenntnisse der NRC Leute im Verlauf des Unfalls.

    Bringe später n paar Quotes zum Besten.
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > Report says Kan's meddling disrupted Fukushima response - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun
    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201202290019

    Das ist wohl was drin. Anderseits muss man wohl fragen, ob dabei nicht auch von anderen Fehlern/von den Fehlern Anderer abgelenkt wird.
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > Private panel blames TEPCO's 'systematic negligence' - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun
    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201202280030

    Systematic negligence by Tokyo Electric Power Co. contributed to the Fukushima nuclear disaster, according to a non-government panel.

    The Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident drew on evidence from 300 or so individuals, including key figures such as former Prime Minister Naoto Kan, former industry minister Banri Kaieda and Haruki Madarame, chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC). However, a request for interviews with TEPCO's top management was rejected by the company.

    Its report, compiled on Feb. 27, argues that the Fukushima nuclear crisis was essentially a man-made disaster, rather than being the inevitable result of the magnitude-9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11.

    The panel, headed by Koichi Kitazawa, former chairman of the Japan Science and Technology Agency, blames systematic failures by TEPCO, the operator of the stricken plant, and weaknesses in the government’s regulatory regime for the disaster triggered by the earthquake and massive tsunami it spawned.

    The report says the accident worsened because TEPCO falsely believed on the night of March 11 that the isolation condensers at the No. 1 reactor were operational.

    A delayed injection of water into the reactors, late venting of gas to reduce internal pressure, and problems with decision-making because of the absence of TEPCO's president, Masataka Shimizu, and chairman, Tsunehisa Katsumata, before 10 a.m. on March 12, all contributed to the loss of control at the plant, its says.

    The panel describes TEPCO’s failings as amounting to "systematic negligence" and characterizes the culture of the company immediately before the disaster as irresponsible.

    "TEPCO used to make light of the culture of nuclear safety," according to the report.

    The panel also argues that the government's safety regime contributed to the disaster. In 2007, the International Atomic Energy Agency called for a clearer distinction of roles between the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the NSC. However, the NSC did not comply with the recommendation, arguing that Japan's safety regulations were "very excellent in the light of international standards and have been highly evaluated."

    Measures to deal with very severe accidents were not obligatory, and international cooperation to deal with possible terrorist threats to plants proceeded slowly.

    The report’s authors argue that Japan’s nuclear safety regulations were "Galapagosized," a concept in Japan referring to a perceived tendency for some Japanese industries to isolate themselves from international standards like the isolated wildlife on the Galapagos Islands.

    Simulation results on the diffusion of radioactive substances, forecast by the government's System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), were not released to the public immediately following the disaster. Also, the "off-site center," a facility located about 5 kilometers from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant that was supposed to serve as a response base in case of emergencies, did not fulfill its functions during the crisis.

    These "appeared to have been 'make-believe' arrangements to reassure local residents," the report says.

    The panel calls for the creation of a body to deal with severe disasters and accidents and the fortification of functions to advise the prime minister on science and technology issues.

    On the facts of the disaster, the panel largely backs the findings of the interim report of the government's Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, although there are some points of divergence.

    For example, while the government committee largely accepted TEPCO’s assertion that its president never asked for a total withdrawal of staff from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, the private panel is more skeptical.

    Shimizu, the TEPCO president at the time, told the government on the night of March 14-15 that he wanted to evacuate workers from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant. The prime minister's office took his words to mean that he was indicating a total withdrawal, but TEPCO has since argued that was a misunderstanding.

    The government investigation committee's report said that Shimizu did not expressly say that reactor control personnel would remain at the plant, because he took it for a matter of course. The private panel’s report distances itself from that interpretation of the March events, pointing out that TEPCO did not give any figure for the number of personnel that would be required to stay at the time.

    The private panel's report also quotes a U.S. official as saying that Japan's NISA declined to take measures, recommended by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to ensure the ability to cool down reactors in the case of terrorist attacks and other situations. That constituted a grave "failure to act," the report says.

    The report also includes the whole text of the "worst-case scenario" drawn up in late March by Shunsuke Kondo, chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, at Kan's request.

    Masao Yoshida, the general manager of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant at the time of the accident, continued pumping in seawater to the No. 1 reactor at his own discretion, although the TEPCO head office had told him to stop the injection. "The head office was going astray all the time," the report says.

    Yoshida's action turned out to have been the right choice in retrospect, but the action was problematic from the viewpoint of crisis management, because it upset the chain of responsibility, the report says.

    The Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission is expected to submit a report on the Fukushima disaster in June.


  • TimTim Februar 2012
    > EDITORIAL: Following panel's report, TEPCO should go on record - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun
    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201202290047
  • TimTim Februar 2012
    image

    > Poor communications botched radiation monitoring on March 12 - AJW by The Asahi Shimbun
    http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201202240055

    Japan failed to monitor the spread of radioactive materials due to a lack of communication among ministries the day after the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant was damaged by the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake.

    The Self-Defense Forces sent a helicopter to pick up personnel for airborne monitoring, but could not find anyone from the science ministry or its affiliate responsible for the survey at the meeting point, sources said.

    It was crucial to find out in which directions airborne radioactive materials were spreading on March 12, when the damaged nuclear power plant began releasing large amounts of radioactive substances into the atmosphere while vast numbers of residents were evacuating.

    The U.S. Energy Department conducted a similar exercise for more than 40 hours between March 17 and 19, deploying personnel and aircraft from the United States.

    A map released March 22 showed a high-radiation area extending northwest from the Fukushima No. 1 plant, a pattern of contamination later confirmed by other studies.

    The government was not able to conduct airborne monitoring until March 25 due to reasons other than miscommunication.

    “The flow of information stagnated at the bottom of a small pot of compartmentalized bureaucracy and administration, barring resources from being utilized,” said an official of a private-sector panel investigating the Fukushima accident.

    In its report--to be compiled soon--the independent committee is expected to conclude that Japan’s failure to conduct airborne monitoring called the nation's key functions into question.

    In airborne monitoring, personnel in airplanes or helicopters measure radiation levels hundreds of meters above ground and plot their distribution on an electronic map. They measure data using a radiation detector, Global Positioning System and notebook computers.

    According to the Defense Ministry, the SDF’s Joint Staff Office on March 12 decided to send a Ground SDF midsize helicopter, which had been conducting rescue operations for tsunami victims, for airborne monitoring at the request from the science ministry.

    The helicopter left the GSDF’s Camp Kasuminome in Sendai at 11:10 a.m. and landed in a park in Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, at 1 p.m. The Nuclear Safety Technology Center, affiliated with the science ministry, keeps equipment for airborne monitoring at its facility in the village.

    The SDF had been told that officials would be waiting at the park, according to the Defense Ministry. But no one from the science ministry or the center was found. The helicopter left the park at 1:10 p.m. and returned to the camp at 2:30 p.m.

    The Nuclear Safety Technology Center said it received a request from the science ministry at 1:30 p.m. Two officials in charge of monitoring waited for the helicopter at the park for about an hour from 2:40 p.m.

    The officials thought the helicopter was giving priority to rescue operations. They left for Fukushima by car at a little past 9 a.m. on March 13.

    The officials finally met an SDF helicopter at a sports field in Ono, Fukushima Prefecture, on March 15. They took off at 11:20 a.m., but had to cancel the survey after a report of an explosion at the No. 4 reactor of the Fukushima No. 1 plant.

    From March 16, the SDF was occupied with an emergency operation of throwing water onto pools to cool spent nuclear fuel at the plant. The first monitoring was conducted on March 25.

    A science ministry official said the industry ministry’s Emergency Response Center proposed airborne monitoring and coordinated the project with the Defense Ministry. The official also said reports from the center were immediately relayed to the Nuclear Safety Technology Center.

    An industry ministry official said it is investigating the case, saying that the chief of the radiation section at the Emergency Response Center at the time was from the science ministry.


  • TimTim März 2012
    The inside of the offsite center was shown to the press for the first time since the accident. They saw the large screen supposed to show each reactor's realtime data or predictions of the spreading of radiations, which did not function at all. The phone system supposed to reach each local government's person in charge by pushing a button also did not function because of the blackout. The offsite center had no air filtering system, and the radiation eventually rose to 200 μSv/hour so it had to be evacuated. The Nuclear Safety Commission has a plan to divide offsite centers into two parts. One part would be far enough from the plant, and the other part, in charge of evacuations would be close to the plant. But the final decision has not been taken yet.


    Source: http://physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3794632&postcount=12463
  • TimTim März 2012
    > International | Aus der Atomkatastrophe in Fukushima kaum gelernt | Schweizer Radio DRS
    http://www.drs.ch/www/de/drs/sendungen/international/2675.sh10214798.html

    Ein knappes Jahr nach der Katastrophe im japanischen Atomkraftwerk Fukushima behaupten die Betreibergesellschaft und die Behörden, sie hätten die Lage unter Kontrolle. Damit verfolgen sie die gleiche Strategie, die sie in der Atompolitik wie seit Jahrzehnten betreiben: Beschönigung und Schlamperei. Doch die Menschen sind misstrauisch geworden.


    28 Minuten Audiobeitrag
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Japan PM: No individual to blame for Fukushima | EXSKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/03/japan-pm-no-individual-to-blame-for.html

    Sehr zynisch .. anderseits ist es bei uns auch nicht (viel) anders.
    Immerhin liegt seine Zustimmung (oder die seiner Regierung) bei 6% derzeit - das ist auch eine Leistung..
  • TimTim März 2012
    Siehe auch:

    > Panel: Regulators Unprepared for Fukushima Disaster - WSJ.com
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203391104577121872005287232.html
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Ministry of Educaiton on SPEEDI Simulation: "We Can't Make This Public...." | EXSKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.com/2012/03/ministry-of-educaiton-on-speedi.html
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Records show Japan gov't knew meltdown risk early - The Mainichi Daily News
    http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120310p2g00m0dm103000c.html

    The revelations were in documents released Friday, almost a year after the disaster. The minutes of the government's crisis management meetings from March 11 -- the day the earthquake and tsunami struck -- until late December were not recorded and had to be reconstructed retroactively.


    Das soll was bedeuten?

  • Der Nutzer und alle zugehörigen Inhalte wurden gelöscht.
  • Der Nutzer und alle zugehörigen Inhalte wurden gelöscht.
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Messages show conflict within NRC after Japan earthquake and tsunami - The Washington Post
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/messages-show-conflict-within-nrc-after-japan-earthquake-and-tsunami/2012/01/09/gIQA2ll6uQ_print.html

    Selbst der Energy Secretary Chu hatte scheinbar nicht volles Vertrauen in die NRC.. braucht einen auch nicht wundern, wenn man die Protokolle ließt.
    Auch wenn eine Regierung und dessen Organisationen viel Wert auf ihre Kommunikation legen müssen, sieht man schon recht deutlich wo die Prioritäten bei der NRC liegen.
  • TimTim März 2012
    On 14 March it was found by the Diet's investigation commission that a video showing the then prime minister Naoto Kan visiting Tepco's main office on 15 March 2011 has been recorded. However, the sound and voices were not recorded. According to a commission member, during the 50 minutes when they were busy to respond to the prime minister, the emergency response center was not functioning. According to another commission member it is "strange" that only those 50 minutes are without records of voice. The president of the commission also says "I was surprised" to learn that there is no voice recording.


    Source: http://physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3814662&postcount=696

    :D Bestes "Kino"...
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Nuclear safety agency opposed expansion of safety measures in 2006 - The Mainichi Daily News
    http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120316p2g00m0dm012000c.html
  • waeckywaecky März 2012
    > Fukushima Pref. deleted 5 days of radiation dispersion data just after meltdowns
    http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120322p2a00m0na012000c.html
  • clancy688clancy688 März 2012
    Kopf -> Wand
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Tokyo Shinbun: "#Fukushima Prefecture Deleted SPEEDI Emails" | EXSKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.de/2012/03/tokyo-shinbun-fukushima-prefecture.html
  • TimTim März 2012
    > Now They Tell Us: #Fukushima's Off-Site Center Didn't Even Have a Map That Showed Areas Outside 10-Kilometer Radius From the Plant | EXSKF
    http://ex-skf.blogspot.de/2012/03/now-they-tell-us-fukushimas-off-site.html

    Sieht das bei uns anders aus?
  • TimTim März 2012
    Hier noch mehr Kontext zu den "nutzlosen" SPEEDI Daten..

    > Fukushima Government Deleted SPEEDI Reports During Disaster | SimplyInfo
    http://www.simplyinfo.org/?p=5503
  • clancy688clancy688 April 2012
    Ich hab Mitte der Woche mal eine E-Mail an Dr. Christoph Pistner vom Oeko-Institut e.V. Darmstadt geschrieben. Auf youtube hatte ich einen kurzen Vortrag von ihm (an der TU Darmstadt) über den Unfall von Fukushima gefunden. An sich keine neuen Infos, nur eine kurze und gute Zusammenfassung, deswegen hab ich den hier auch nicht gepostet.

    Allerdings meinte er in Bezug auf den IC, dass er die Schaltlogik (bei Stromausfall -> Ventile schließen) nicht besonders logisch findet.
    Weil ich vor einiger Zeit mal ein GE Patent über einen Isolation Condenser gefunden hatte, in dem die Ingenieure genau erklärten, warum sie das Teil so schalten (wenn die IC-Rohre reißen, hat der Reaktorbehälter eine direkte Verbindung zur Außenwelt. Bei einer Kernschmelze ein absoluter Albtraum, da direkte Freisetzung ohne Filterung whatsoever) dachte ich mir, dass ich ihm das Teil mal per Mail schicke.

    Er hat mir daraufhin zurückgeschrieben, dass auf einem IAEA-Expertenmeeting im März eine andere Begründung genannt wurde:

    Wenn es zu Bränden im Reaktorgebäude kommt und die IC-Stromversorgung ausfällt, die restlichen Kühlsysteme aber intakt bleiben, kann's durch die offenen Ventile zu einer zu schnellen Abkühlung kommen. Das gilt es zu verhindern, daher soll der IC in so einem Fall automatisch dicht machen.
  • TimTim April 2012
    Sehr interessante Infos clancy. Danke!
  • clancy688clancy688 Mai 2012
    EX-SKF hat mal wieder was ausgebuddelt:

    http://ex-skf.blogspot.de/2012/04/reporting-by-fukushima-local-newspaper.html


    For the national government, a nuclear power plant was not supposed to have an accident and therefore an accident would never happen and there would be no need to train the residents for emergency that would never happen. For the prefectural government, there was no such word as "severe accident". If they didn't mention the word, it wouldn't happen.


    Klingt doch irgendwie vertraut, oder?

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